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 Abstract 
The Chinese banking system, characterized by a large proportion of state-ownership and low 
capitalization, has started a reform process based on three main pillars: (i) bank restructuring, 
with the cleaning-up of non-performing loans and public capital injections, particularly in the 
four largest state-owned banks; (ii) financial liberalization, with the gradual flexibilizaton of 
price and quantity controls and the opening-up to foreign competition; and (iii) strengthened 
financial regulation and supervision, as well as better risk management, corporate 
governance, disclosure, and the introduction of international standards. Although it is still early 
to judge on the success of the reform, the available evidence does not offer a very optimistic 
outlook. The solvency of Chinese banks is still very weak, with a stubbornly high level of 
non-performing loans, and profitability is poor. Given the commitment of the Chinese 
authorities to fully open up its banking system to foreign competition by 2006, it seems crucial 
that financial reform accelerates so that the Chinese banking system can compete at the 
international level. This is particularly the case for the reduction of NPLs and bank 
recapitalization as well as for a furthered improvement of bank regulation and supervision. 
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ACRONYMS 
AMCs Asset management companies 
CBRC China Banking and Regulatory Commission 
CCBs City commercial banks 
ITICs International trust and investment corporation 
JSCBs Joint-stock commercial bank 
NPLs Non-performing loans 
PBC People's Bank of China 
PPP Purchasing Power Parity 
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ROAA Return on average assets  
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SAFE State Administration of Foreign Exchange  
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1 Introduction 
The Chinese authorities are in the process of transforming a centrally-planned economy into a 
market based one. Given that China has one fourth of the world’s population and 12.5% of 
its GDP measured in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) (Graph A-1 and Graph A-2), 
such process is bound to have consequences at the global level. The authorities’ efforts go in 
three main directions: macroeconomic stabilization, restructuring of the real and financial 
sectors, and liberalizing the financial system. 
Macroeconomic stabilization has been very successful since inflation has been 
brought down to single digits in the second half of the 1990s while maintaining sustained 
economic growth of around 8% on average (Graph A-3). This has increased income per 
capita from about USD 700 in PPP terms in 1980 to USD 4,000 in 2002 (Graph A-1). One of 
the main engines of China’s fast growth is its competitiveness, with very low labour costs, 
and a depreciating exchange rate until 1995 and constant thereafter (Graph A-4). This has 
contributed to the accumulation of large current account surpluses (Graph A-5). Gross capital 
formation and exports have also increased their contribution to economic growth, as well as 
private consumption (Graph A-6). 
The restructuring of the real and financial sectors and the liberalization of the financial 
system have proceeded relatively slowly notwithstanding the reform efforts. This has not 
inhibited the size of the financial system increasing very fast, at average growth rates of 20% 
a year for broad money and bank domestic credit (Graph A-7), and reaching 190% of GDP 
and nearly 180% of GDP, respectively (Graph A-8). Stock market capitalization and the stock 
of government debt issued have also risen albeit at slower pace (Graph A-9). 
This has resulted in China’s financial system becoming one of the largest in the 
world, not only in relative terms, as percentage of GDP (Graph A-10) but also in absolute 
terms (Graph A-11). This is particularly impressive if one considers that financial systems tend 
to be larger the bigger a country’s GDP per capita while the latter is relatively low in China 
(Graph A-12).  
This paper analyzes and assesses the ongoing reform of the Chinese financial 
system. Although three main areas of reform can be identified –the banking system, the 
capital markets and the capital account– we concentrate on the first. In fact, the banking 
system continues to be the driving force of the Chinese financial system although it must be 
acknowledged that its reform is closely intertwined with the rest as part of a global strategy. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the structure of the Chinese bank 
system is described. Section 3 summarizes the main steps taken towards reform in the areas 
of bank restructuring, financial liberalization and bank regulation and supervision. Section 4 
informs of the next steps announced by the Chinese authorities. Finally, Section 5 is an 
evaluation of the reform process after which a number of recommendations are offered to 
contribute to the success of the reform. 
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2 The Chinese Bank System 
Until 1979, China had a monobank financial system, as other centrally planned economies. 
The People’s Bank of China (PBC) was the only bank and, therefore, in charge of a large 
number of issues, such as the conduct of monetary policy, exchange policy, foreign reserve 
management, deposit-taking, commercial lending activities, and the financing of development 
projects. The introduction of a two-tier banking system in 1979 was the first milestone in the 
modernization of the Chinese financial system. 
The reform efforts carried on by the Chinese authorities in the last three decades 
have led to the current structure of the financial system. The banking system continues to be 
the main player in the Chinese financial system although the importance of capital markets is 
growing fast. By end-2002, bank loans represented 61 per cent of the entire financial sector 
and the stock and bond markets accounted for 22 and 17 percent, respectively1. Total assets 
of the banking sector were more than USD 2,850 billion at end-2002, representing 
around 225 percent of China’s GDP (Table 1). The bond market was the second biggest in 
absolute terms in non-Japan Asia, after South Korea, with USD 250 billion but it only 
amounted to 20% of China’s GDP in comparison to 140% of GDP for the first Asian issuer, 
Japan. Also at end-2002, the Chinese stock market counted with USD 520 billion, equivalent 
to 41% of GDP Graph A-9). 
Today China’s banking sector counts with two regulatory institutions, the central 
bank (PBC) and the China Banking and Regulatory Commission (CBRC), both ultimately 
overseen by the State Council (the cabinet), and the rest of the financial system (Chart 1 
below).  
The PBC is currently in charge of the monetary policy and the liquidity of the financial 
system. It aims at promoting economic growth and price stability. The PBC manages the 
interest rate bands for loans and deposits, since interest rates are not fully liberalized yet, the 
reserve requirements and other instruments affecting banks’ liquidity. The PBC also monitors 
and regulates the credit expansion of a large share of the banking system.  
The CBRC was established in April 2003 to take over the regulatory and supervisory 
functions of the banking sector so that the PBC could concentrate on monetary policy 
matters. Its objectives include protecting consumers and depositors, maintaining the stability 
in the banking system, enhancing banks competitiveness, encouraging competition, 
educating the public on the role of finance and eradicating financial crime. To this end, it 
focuses on the strength of financial institutions, capital adequacy issues, and the restructuring 
of the banking sector. 
There is also a number of non-bank financial institutions in the Chinese banking 
system. The main ones are the Trust and Investment Corporations (TICs), created in 
the 1980s to support the development of the private sector and to provide financing outside 
the credit quotas imposed to commercial banks. Some TICs act as the investment instrument 
of local or provincial governments. Some others are intermediaries of international funds 
(through bond issues or syndicated medium and long term loans) to finance local companies 
and infrastructure and construction projects. Other important non-bank financial institutions 
are Asset Management Companies (AMCs), established in 1999 to receive the 
non-performing loans (NPLs) from the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and recover 
them through different asset resolution techniques. Securities companies have played an 
important role in the development of the stock exchanges since the 1990s. Their ownership 
has become more diversified with an increasing participation of the private sector. Insurance 
                                                                          
1. Deutsche Bank Research (2004). 
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companies, in turn, are basically in state hands although most of the newly created 
companies are joint-stock ones and have shifted their focus from market share to economic 
return. Since China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) entry, foreign companies have 
expressed great interest in the Chinese insurance sector.  
The core of the Chinese financial system, the banking system, includes four 
large SOCBs, three policy lending banks and a large number of other commercial banks, 
credit cooperatives and financial institutions. Among the commercial banks, there are eleven 
joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs), which were initially created to provide specialized 
product niches but now offer a full range of financial services. At the local level, there are 
more than 110 city commercial banks (CCBs), 1,000 urban credit cooperatives (UCCs), 
and 35,000 rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) providing basic banking services. 
 
Chart 1. Structure of the Chinese financial system 
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The four SOCBs2, the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China, the China 
Construction Bank, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, were established in 
                                                                          
2. In the process of establishing a two-tier banking system, the government in 1979 first removed the monopolistic 
position of the PBC by establishing the Agricultural Bank of China, the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank. 
The Agricultural Bank of China’s objective was to foster rural banking business and to take the supervisory authority of a 
network of rural credit cooperatives that had been providing small-scale rural banking. The Bank of China was assigned 
foreign currency transactions, while the China Construction Bank focused on the construction sector. The government 
completed a two-tier banking system by removing commercial banking activities from the PBC and transferring them to 
the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the fourth specialized bank, established in 1984. 
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the 1980s. They were assigned sector policy objectives, previously in the hands of the PBC 
with the monobank system. In 1994, with the creation of the policy lending banks, their 
responsibilities were restricted to commercial purposes. Although their assets have fallen in 
the last two decades (from 77% of total assets in the banking system in 1995 to 60% at the 
end of 2003 as shown in Table 1), they are still very large. In fact, they are among the biggest 
banks in the world, with total assets in the range of USD 2,000 billion and an extensive 
branch network (with a total of 42,000 offices) and over 700,000 employees at the end 
of 2002. The SOCBs have been the primary source of finance for large state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), where soft-budget constraints have been a common practice, as in other 
centrally-planed economies. This explains the large concentration of NPLs in the SOCBs, 
which continues to constrain their profitability. They are also very active lenders to other 
financial institutions (Table 2). The fact that SOCBs are still fully state-owned and the objective 
of their managers is not necessarily profit maximization also impinges on their profitability. 
Table A-1 shows that their return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average 
equity (ROEE) are lower than in other Chinese commercial banks. 
Three policy lending banks were created in 1994 to carry out the development 
policies previously assigned to the SOCBs and hold about 8% of total bank assets. These are 
the Agricultural Development Bank, the China Development Bank, and the Export-Import 
Bank of China. Their main objectives are agricultural development, national infrastructure and 
foreign trade, respectively, with special attention to the poorer western and central regions. 
Policy lending banks fund themselves through central bank loans, government deposits and 
the issuance of government-guaranteed deposits held by commercial banks. They also lend 
extensively to the government (as shown in Table 2). Even more than in the case of SOCBs, 
profitability is only a residual objective for their managers. 
There are a number of other commercial banks in the Chinese banking system, 
with a diverse ownership structure and geographical scope. Part of them has been used as 
an experiment for the liberalization process of the financial system and others are specialized 
in some market niches. There are two main groups: joint-stock commercial banks and city 
commercial banks: 
Joint-stock commercial banks (JSBCs) are partially owned by local governments 
and SOEs, and sometimes by the private sector. There are currently eleven banks –five of 
which listed on local stock markets– and account for 10% of total bank assets. The biggest 
ones are Bank of Communications, China Minsheng Bank3, China Everbright Bank, China 
Merchants Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank and Shenzen Development Bank. 
The JSCBs finance small SOEs and firms with partial private ownership, including small and 
medium size enterprises (SMEs). They maintain much smaller branch networks than SOCBs, 
typically confined to the region of origin or to the fast growing coastal area, although they are 
generally allowed to operate at the national level. They may also carry out most bank 
activities, including accepting deposits, extending loans, and providing foreign exchange and 
international transaction services. In the last few years, their relative market-oriented 
corporate culture has allowed them to gain market share at the expense of the SOCBs. 
Since the mid-1990s, city commercial banks (CCBs) have been created by 
restructuring and consolidating UCCs. There are currently 112, accounting for about 5% of 
total assets in 2003. Their capital is in the hands of urban enterprises and local governments. 
They are not allowed to operate at the national or regional scale unlike the JSCBs, which is 
their major competitive disadvantage. Finally, CCBs lend to small and medium size 
enterprises, collective and local residents in their municipalities. 
 
                                                                          
3. China Minsheng Bank is the only one fully privately owned. It focuses on lending to the private sector, including joint 
ventures with foreign partners. 
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Rural and urban credit cooperatives (RCCs and UCCs, respectively) were 
established in the 1980s as a mechanism to diversify the financial system and to finance 
projects in areas where resources were scarce. Their share of assets was 11.4% as of 
end-2003, marking a steady reduction since 1995 (with 15.9% of total bank assets). Credit 
cooperatives typically provide credit to small and medium-sized rural or urban enterprises and 
individuals. Their lending policies are subject to the control of the local public authorities. 
Nowadays, rural credit cooperatives are more important and numerous than urban ones, after 
the consolidation of the latter into city commercial banks. As of June 2003, there were 
about 35,000 RCCs, providing 80% of rural finance, and 1,000 UCCs. RCCs are burdened 
by NPLs, which are bound to increase when the agricultural sector opens up under WTO 
requirements. 
Foreign banks play a very limited role in the Chinese banking system. As of 
September 2003, there were 191 licensed foreign banking institutions, among which 157 are 
branches, 11 sub-branches and 15 subsidiaries incorporated locally with 8 branches4. They 
hold 0.3% of the local currency lending market and around 13% in the foreign currency 
lending market; all in all about 1.2% of total bank assets. In addition, some JSCBs are 
partially owned by foreigners.  
 
Table 1. Share on assets by type of institution 
end-period SOCBs
Policy Banks 
and Other 
Commercial 
Banks
Credit 
Cooperatives
Foreign Funded 
Banks
Other 
Institutions
Total Assets 
(USD billion)
1995 77.0 7.2 15.9 - - 891
1996 75.0 8.8 16.3 - - 1,113
1997 73.9 8.7 16.3 - 1.0 1,353
1998 73.6 9.2 16.1 - 1.0 1,510
1999 73.2 10.0 15.7 - 1.0 1,677
2000 71.5 11.9 15.5 - 1.1 1,869
2001 68.4 13.6 16.5 - 1.4 2,009
2002 62.6 19.7 11.1 1.2 5.4 2,839
2003 61.0 21.5 11.4 1.2 4.9 3,356
Source: CEIC Database
(as % of total bank assets)
 
 
Table 2. Structure of banks’ balance sheet as of June 2003 
Foreign 
assets
Reserve 
assets
Claims on  
government 
(1)
Claims on 
non- 
financial 
institutions
Claims on 
financial 
institutions
Other 
assets
Total 
assets
State commercial banks 77.3 62.6 62.9 62 77.5 50.7 62.7
Policy lending banks and other 
commercial banks
14.1 22.4 28.9 23.7 18.6 25.3 23.3
Credit cooperatives 0.2 13.5 5.7 11.7 2.5 18.8 10.9
Other institutions 0.1 0.9 2.3 1.7 1.1 3.6 1.7
Foreign banks 8.3 0.6 0.2 1 0.2 1.6 1.3
(1) Including central bank bonds.
There may be slight differences with previous table due to different sources of information
Source: People's Bank of China
(as % of the total bank assets)
 
The previously mentioned reduction in the SOCBs share can be explained by the 
increasing importance of JSCBs and CCBs. Both have proven to be generally more profitable 
than SOCBs (Table A-1) and count with a more effective management and weaker 
government interference. 
 
                                                                          
4. Ping (2003). 
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These developments have reduced the concentration of the Chinese banking system 
although it is still high for international standards. In fact, the share of assets in the four largest 
banks has fallen from 77% to 61%. The Herfindahl index displays a similar pattern (Graph 1)5. 
 
Graph 1. Concentration on assets 
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Finally, the asset and liability structure of the Chinese banking system has also 
experienced some transformations in the past few years. On the asset side (Table A-2), loans 
continue to have the largest share, of nearly 59% in 2002. This is even more the case for 
policy banks. Risky assets have become the second largest (nearly 25% of total assets), 
having experienced a rapid growth in the last eight years. In turn, liquid assets have drastically 
reduced their share from nearly 24% to 6%. This is in line with the steady reduction of banks’ 
reserve requirements. On the liability side (Table A-3), the share of deposits has continued to 
increase reaching 93% of total liabilities. This is even higher in SOCBs and much less so 
in JSCBs. Finally, the share of capital and reserves has always been very low and the trend 
since 1998 is towards a further reduction. Finally, the income structure (Table A-4) is quite 
similar for all commercial banks. Interest income represents around 95% of the overall income 
and commission income around 4%. The latter has more than doubled in eight years, in line 
with a similar reduction in interest income. This points to a certain degree of substitution 
between the two types of income. 
 
                                                                          
5. Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of each individual firm. 
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3 Steps taken in banking reform  
China’s financial system has experienced a deep transformation in the past two decades. 
After the substitution of the monobank system for a multi-tiered one, the core reforms started 
in 1994, when policy lending banks were created in order to take over public policy lending 
duties from the SOCB. In 1995, a new Commercial Banking Law laid the foundations for 
commercially-oriented banking. At the same time, a new Charter for the PBC was approved 
with three main responsibilities: monetary stability, banking supervision, and oversight of the 
payments system. This charter, though, did not grant independence to the PBC, which 
remained under the control of the State Council. In 2003, banking supervision competences 
were transferred from the PBC to the CBRC. 
Additional reforms took place after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, aimed at 
gradually transforming a fully state-owned banking system into a profitable and competitive 
one. The three main areas of reform were: (i) restructuring, through the cleaning up of NPLs, 
recapitalization and merger and closure of unviable institutions; (ii) financial liberalization, 
through the reduction of government interference in the system, market determination of 
lending, greater transparency and opening up to foreign competition pursuant to 
China’s WTO commitments; and (iii) improved regulation and supervision. These three areas 
are first analyzed with some detail in the following sections and, then, summarized in Table 6. 
3.1 Restructuring 
The poor capitalization of the Chinese banking system and the very large amount of NPLs is 
one of the main problems faced by the Chinese authorities. This is particularly the case for the 
four SOCBs, which have maintained older and closer relations with SOEs. 
The reported improvement in asset quality in recent years is mainly based on the 
rapid credit growth, associated with the investment boom and new export opportunities.6 In 
fact, while the share of NPLs to total loans has recently fallen from 25% in the last few years 
to 20% of total loans (equivalent to 17% of GDP), the stock of NPLs in USD has remained 
stubbornly high, at USD 232 billion in mid-2003. This implies a very small reduction compared 
to 2002 and an increase compared to previous years. (Table 3). When considering the whole 
financial system (i.e., including the AMC where NPLs have been transferred), NPLs amount 
to 36% of GDP, equivalent to a stock of USD 480 billion (Table 4). Independent analysts tend 
to have even higher estimates of NPLs, of about 50% of GDP for the financial system as a 
whole. 
The problem is most acute in the credit cooperatives, which have accumulated the 
largest share of NPLs as a percentage of their loans (30%). These are followed by SOCBs 
with 20% of NPLs although differences exist among the four. The Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China accumulates the largest share of NPLs (Table 5). This is probably due to its 
specialization, which implies tighter relations with SOEs. 
 
                                                                          
6. According to the Institute of International Finance (2004), two-thirds of the reduction of the NPLs reported by the 
four SOCBs from more than 25% of total loans as of December of 2002 to 20% as of December 2003 was due to an 
increase in new loans. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 18 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 0406 
Table 3. Reported NPLs in SOCBs 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
NPLs (USD billions) 155 75 198 196 213 245 232
Total Loans (USD billions) - 753 793 786 850 968 1,139
Ratio of NPLs (as % of total loans) 25 10 25 25 25 25 20
NPL (as % of GDP) 17.2 7.9 20 18.2 18.4 19.8 17
Source: Pei & Shirai (2004) based on Chinese authorities and own calcultaions  
Table 4. Reported NPLs in Chinese financial system 
as of USD billion
NPL ratio    
(% of total 
loans)
% of GDP (1)
State owned commercial banks Dec-03 232 20 17
Joint Stock Commercial Banks Mar-04 23 7 2
Policy Banks Jun-03 19 18 1
Credit cooperatives Mar-04 60 30 4
Banking system total Dec-03 373 19 28
Asset management companies Dec-03 107 - 8
Financial system total Mar-04 480 - 36
(1) June 2003 annual GDP
Source: Authors' own estimations based on official figures reported by Bofit (2004), Ernst & Young (2004), 
Ping (2003) and Pei & Shirai (2004).
 
Table 5. NPL ratio in each SOCB 
2000 2001 2002 sep-03
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 34.4 29.8 25.7 21
Bank of China 27.2 27.5 22.5 17
China Construction Bank 20.3 19.2 15.2 11
Agricultural Bank of China - 35 30 (1) -
Source： Pei & Shirai (2004)
(1) Figure based on the five-category classification. Under the old four-category classification the ratio would be 
higher than 38%
(based on the Five-Category Classification)
 
The potential consequences of the large stock of NPLs are even more worrisome if 
we take into account the very low capital ratios of Chinese banks, particularly policy lending 
banks and SOCBs. The latter maintain an average risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio 
of 4.6%7, notwithstanding the several recapitalization programs carried out by the Chinese 
government in the last few years8.  
In 1998, the government injected USD 33 billion in equity into the four SOCBs. In the 
period 1999-2000, the SOCBs and one policy lending bank (China Development Bank) were 
allowed to transfer USD 170 billion in NPLs, in book value, to the four newly created AMCs. 
Each of them was assigned the primary goal of maximizing NPLs recoveries from one of 
the SOCBs through different asset resolution techniques9. The separation of NPLs recoveries 
depending on the bank of origin is not the general practice but was preferred by the Chinese 
authorities for several reasons. First, the size of loans at each SOCB is small, on average, and 
the clients are widely dispersed, which makes the recovery of NPLs particularly cumbersome. 
Second, the origin of the loans, mainly relationship lending, is crucial for a successful 
recovery, and this varies for each SOCB since they had a different specialization10. From their 
creation until May 2003, AMCs remain under the supervision of the PBC, with the guidance 
from the State Securities Supervisory Committee and the Ministry of Finance. Thereafter, they 
moved to the newly established CBRC. By end-2003, the AMCs managed more 
than USD 100 billion in NPLs, an amount equivalent to 8% of the GDP (Table 4).  
                                                                          
7. Ping (2003) states that the existing capital rules have favourable risk weights for loans secured by physical collateral 
and guaranteed by other third parties in addition to banks. This means that the capital adequacy ratio would be even 
less if it completely followed the standards of the Basel I Accord.  
8. CCBs and JSCBs are in a better position although still weak, with capital adequacy ratios of 6.8%, and 6%, 
respectively. 
9. The general mandate of the AMCs is to collect debt, restructure, or assign NPLs; convert NPLs into equity; issue 
financial bonds and borrow from financial institutions; and, recommend companies for listing [Pei and Shirai (2004)].  
10. For this reason, the main staff members of each AMC are generally seconded from the relevant SOCB. 
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The recapitalization and cleaning up of NPLs were accompanied by a number 
reforms introduced in SOCBs to improve efficiency and avoid accumulating new NPLs. These 
included the closure of branches and reduction in staff, strengthening bank governance and 
internal controls, the establishment of a board of directors, and the development of credit risk 
management techniques, including internal rating systems in the largest banks.  
The other restructuring steps taken by the Chinese authorities concern the small 
financial institutions. Between 2000 and 2002, the consolidation of RCCs and UCCs as well 
as TICs was instrumented by closures and mergers mainly at the provincial level. In 
August 2003, additional measures were taken to rehabilitate RCCs. In particular, they were 
given specific milestone objectives which, if complied with, would allow them to receive new 
capital injections from the PBC or the local government. Notwithstanding the restructuring, 
the government control on the credit allowances to farmers remains tight, given the 
importance attached to raising rural income. 
3.2 Liberalization 
The liberalization efforts of the Chinese authorities started in 1997 with the introduction of a 
number of market practices in the functioning of the banking system. They continued in 1998 
by granting SOCBs more responsibility in their lending decisions and removing a number of 
their credit quotas. In 1998 reserve requirements were reduced from 20% to 8% and again 
to 6% in November 1999. In addition, the remuneration of excess reserves was lowered to 
discourage banks from hoarding liquid assets. This explains the previously mentioned steady 
reduction in liquid assets (Table A-2). In addition, some flexibility was introduced in setting 
interest rates in the wholesale market, the interbank market was unified and the ceiling on 
interbank rates was lifted11.  
An important step was taken in 1999, when government interference in commercial 
lending was explicitly forbidden and a number of private and local banks were established. 
More recently the ceiling on banks’ lending rates was lifted in several occasions. In particular, 
in 2002 banks were permitted to charge borrowers up to 1.3 times the central lending rate. In 
January 2004, it was raised again to 1.7 (Graph 2). With this flexibilization of interest rates, the 
Chinese authorities expect to encourage lending to SMEs, previously shunned by SOEs12. It 
should also improve risk assessment by banks, which need to price loans differently, 
depending on the client. At the same time, nominal lending and deposit rates have fallen 
substantially in the last few years (Graph 2 and Graph 3) while the real lending rate has risen 
from negative levels during the period of double-digit inflation and has remained at about 6% 
from 2000 onwards (Graph 4). Such increase in the real lending rate, although expected in a 
financial system in a liberalization process, is worrisome given the large level of NPLs and the 
rapid credit growth without well-established risk management techniques. Finally, the spread 
between the lending and deposit rates at the same maturity has remained practically constant 
at a safe level of 300 basis points, which does not hint at an improvement in competitiveness 
in the banking system (Graph 5). 
 
                                                                          
11. Shirai (2002b). 
12. It should be noted that these margins differ by type of financial institution and size of the enterprises. The rural credit 
cooperatives in selected areas may set their lending rate between 90 and 150-200 percent of the central bank’s 
benchmark rate. For commercial banks, the lending rate charged to small and medium-sized enterprises may be 
within 90-130 percent of the benchmark rate, and that to large enterprises within 90-110 percent. 
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Graph 2. PBC's nominal lending rate by maturity 
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Graph 3. PBC's nominal household deposit rate by maturity 
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Graph 4. PBC's real lending rate by maturity 
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Graph 5. Spread between lending and deposit rate by maturity 
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A crucial milestone in the financial liberalization process was the conclusion of the 
negotiations for China’s accession to the WTO, in late 2001. The commitments agreed 
under WTO imply the full opening up the banking system to foreign institution. Since WTO 
entry in 2001, all banks –also foreign banks– have been allowed to carry out certain 
transactions in foreign currency, particularly as regards taking deposits. Foreign currency 
transactions have, therefore, been the main activity of foreign banks until accesion, with the 
main purpose of facilitating the operations of foreign direct investors in China. Since 2003, 
foreign banks were authorized to operate in the wholesale market in domestic currency, but 
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with strict geographic limits. From late 2006 onwards, the remaining restrictions will be lifted 
and foreign banks will be allowed to operate in the retail market in domestic currency without 
geographic or business restrictions (Chart 2 shows the time schedule for the opening-up to 
foreign competition by province and type of business). Foreign insurance companies will also 
be allowed to own up to 50% of the equity of joint ventures and to operate in more cities. 
 
Chart 2. Opening up of the banking system to foreign competition:  
Situation by province 
By Geography
Foreign 
companies and 
foreign 
individuals
Chinese domestic 
companies
Chinese 
individuals 
Open Shanghai, Shenzen 1996 2003 2006
Open Tianjing, Dalian 2001 2003 2006
Open Guangzho, Qingdao, Nanjing, Wuhan 2002 2003 2006
Open Jinan, Fuzhou, Chengdu, Chongqing 2003 2003 2006
Open Kunming, Zhuhai, Beijing, Amoy 2004 2004 2006
Open Swatow, Ningbo, Shenyang, Xian 2005 2005 2006
Lift all geographical restrictions 2006 2006 2006
Source: Deutsche Bank Reasearch (2004)
Banking services in foreign currency were liberalized in all regions after WTO accession
Foreign banks can begin to offer services in 
domestic currency to
 
 
3.3 Regulation 
The liberalization and restructuring measures have been accompanied by a strong regulatory 
effort, particularly with respect to loan classification and provisioning, which were far behind 
international standards.  
With the first wave of reforms in the mid 1990s, capital adequacy requirements were 
introduced in all commercial banks in 1995. Other prudential rules followed, such as loan to 
deposit ratios and asset to liquid liabilities.  
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Since 2002, China’s banks have introduced new techniques of credit analysis and 
lending policies more aligned with international practices. The loan classification system was 
reformed in 2002 by adopting an internationally accepted five-tier classification of loans but 
very few banks followed it until recently. In 2004, the loan classification system was 
strengthened again and all banks have been asked to fully comply with it by end of 2005.  
Disclosure has been enhanced, particularly for listed banks, which must go through 
an auditing process as well as the publication of more comprehensive balance sheets and 
income statements. In addition, attempts have been made to improve corporate governance, 
by instituting shareholder boards with outside directors. 
The newly created CBRC pushed for the introduction of Basel Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision from the very beginning and granted legal protection to 
supervisors, as well as accountability and more transparency. Regarding transparency, 
the CBRC has announced plans to issue quarterly NPLs data for the banking sector. 
Finally, the CBRC has an additional challenge related to the local nature of most banks except 
for the large SOCBs, for which it has recently established 36 new local branches. 
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4 Additional steps announced towards financial reform 
In the course of 2004, the Chinese authorities have announced additional steps in the 
domains of restructuring, liberalization and improved regulation 
As regards bank restructuring, a precise goal for the reduction of NPLs at 
the SOCBs has been announced, from the current 20% of total loans to 15% by the end 
of 2005. Second, the SOCBs are due to be listed on the international stock exchanges. It is 
expected that strategic investors are involved in the process in order to diversify the SOCBs’ 
ownership while improving the quality of management, as was done with some JSCBs in the 
period 2000-2002. The first ones to be listed will be the Bank of China and the China 
Construction Bank, in 2004 and 2005 respectively. This explains the additional capital 
injection of USD 22.5 billion, which these two banks received in late 2003, so as to be in a 
better financial condition when listed13. The funds have come directly from the PBC’s foreign 
exchange reserves, through the transfer of rights of ownership of US government bonds14. At 
the same time, a state-owned investment company has been created to organize the future 
listing of these banks on the international markets. In March 2004, the CBRC announced that 
the remaining SOCBs would also be recapitalized and listed in the medium term.  
The second programmed step is the restructuring of RCCs, which include clarifying 
their ownership structure and improving their management capacity. In parallel, the CBRC 
announced it would move ahead with the reforms of other types of financial institutions, 
including policy banks, AMCs, and also JSCBs. To this end, additional improvements in risk 
management, corporate governance and profitability will be required15, as well as the 
elimination of any government interference. 
As regards financial liberalization, the PBC intends to continue introducing 
flexibility in lending rates by widening the margins even further and, finally eliminating them. 
The PBC is also studying the timing for the liberalization of deposit rates. At the same time, 
the overheating of the Chinese economy has led the PBC to revert the situation of ample 
liquidity, favoured by the reduction in reserve requirements during the last few years. From 
late September 2003, these have been raised again from 6% to 7%, prompting some volatility 
in the interbank market with raising interest rates. Regarding the opening-up to foreign 
competition, the need for fresh capital has led the Chinese authorities to announce a lift of the 
limit on bank’s foreign ownership from 15% to 20% of total capital. Moreover, the CBRC 
recently announced that foreign bank expansion will be facilitated and market entry 
encouraged, by reducing the minimum capital requirements and easing administrative 
procedures. 
Finally, additional steps are being taken to improve regulation and supervision. In 
particular, the CBRC will soon issue a new regulation on risk management in line with the 
three-pillar approach of the Basel II accord. This implies that large banks will be expected to 
build their own internal credit risk rating system. The authorities expect that this system to be 
fully operative in three or four years’ time. 
                                                                          
13. This directly boosted these two banks’ capital levels, allowing them to write-off from their balance sheets a significant 
amount of NPLs. Additionally, in July 2004, the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank announced tbe 
issuance of USD 3.5-billions in subordinated bonds in order to fulfil the 8% Basel I capital adequacy ratio. 
14. More specifically, the injection came from the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). 
15. Targets were set on return on equity: 11% by 2005 and 13% by 2007.  
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Table 6. China: Steps in Banking Reforms 
Date Objective Area of reform Description
PBC assigned monetary stability; banking supervision; and 
oversight of the payments system
The Commercial Bank Law introduced capital adequacy 
requirements to all commercial banks among other measures
1996
Creation of a nation-wide interbank 
market and an interbank bond 
market
Regulation Interbank markets unified and developed
1997 First wave of Liberalization Liberalization Financial sector allowed to operate commercially
1997-2000 SOCBs reforms Restructuring
Cutting costs and strengthening bank governance, internal 
controls and credit risk management
1998 Restructuring of PBC Liberalization
PBC provincial branches replaced by 9 regional branches with 
greater independence on credit policy and supervisory decisions
1998
Credit quotas on SOCBs 
eliminated
Liberalization Own responsibility of lending decisions 
1998
Lower reduction in reserve 
requirements. Some flexibility of 
interest rates
Liberalization
Reserve requirements reduced from 20% to 8% and some 
flexibility introduced in interest rates in the wholesale market.
1998 Recapitalization of SOCBs Restructuring Injection of USD 33 billion in equity into 4 SOCBs
1999
Lower government interference in 
lending
Liberalization Forbid government interference in commercial lending
1999 Creation of AMCs Restructuring
Agencies created with the sole goal of disposing NPLs in the 
most cost efficient way 
1999-2000 Transfer of NPLs to AMCs Restructuring
USD 170 billion in NPL (14% of SOCBs loans) transferred to four 
newly established AMCs
Restructuring Insolvent RCC liquidated
Merger with other credit cooperatives and improved supervision
TIC and TICs reform Restructuring Merger with credit cooperatives and closures
UCC reforms Restructuring Merger with other credit cooperatives and closures
Creation and listing of JSCBs Liberalization
Turnover (Corporate governance, diversified ownership and 
reduce political interference through listing in stockmarkets)
2002 Improve of prudential Regulation Regulation
Introduction of loan classification system and provisioning 
requirements in line with Basel I accord
2002-2006
WTO-related opening up to foreign 
ownership 
Liberalization
2002
Client restrictions on foreign 
currency business lifted
Liberalization
Foreign currency restrictions lifted both for domestic and foreign 
banks' wholesale and retail operations immediately after WTO 
entry
2003
Foreign entry for wholesale 
operations
Liberalization Conduct domestic currency business with Chinese firms
2003 Creation of CBRC Regulation Taking over regulatory and supervisory functions of PBC 
PBC's international reserves used for recapitalization of two 
SOCBs
Domestic banks allowed to issue subordinated bonds
Date Objective Area of reform Description
2004 onwards Liberalization of interest rates Liberalization
PBC is to widen the margin from the central rate for banks to 
freely set interest rates. Announced liberalization of deposit rates 
2004-2005 Listing of SOCBs Liberalization
To improve corporate governance, diversify ownership and 
reduce political interference
2006
Opening of retail market to foreign 
banks 
Liberalization
To conduct domestic currency business with Chinese retail 
consumers
RCC reform Restructuring
To clarify the RCCs' ownership structure and improve their 
management capacity
2004-2005 Basel II accord Regulation
For big banks to build an internal credit risk rating system in 3-4 
years
1995
Laws governing PBC and 
Commercial Banks
Regulation
Reforms already taken
RCC reform
Banking Bailout2003 Restructuring
Announced Reforms
2000-2002
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Date Objective Area of reform Description
Transfer of ownership to the Private Sector
Additional emphasis in risk management and corporate 
governance
Stricter accounting, Internal Reporting and Disclosure Standards
Adopting International Accounting Standards
Reduction of tax burden
Stricter Regulatory and Prudential Enforcement
Framework for asset resolution regarding collateral, foreclosure 
and creditors rights need to be solved
Liberalization Improvement of statistics and banking data
Expected Reforms
Restructuring
Regulation
Second wave of Liberalization: 
Announcement of a 
Comprehensive Reform Strategy
2004-2006
Sources: Own authors based on several sources of information among which Karacadag, C. (2003) "China: Financial System Soundness 
and Reform", IMF  
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5 An assessment of the banking reform so far and suggestions for future steps 
From the information above, there is no doubt about the commitment of the Chinese 
authorities to reform the banking system and the measures taken seem to go in the right 
direction. However, clear results are yet to be seen. This is particularly worrisome in a country 
who intends to fully liberalize and open its banking system by late 2006.  
As previously mentioned, the restructuring process has not yet been very 
successful if one considers the stubbornly high levels of NPLs and the low solvency ratios. In 
fact, the reduction in the share of NPLs to total loans is due to the growth of new credit, 
which could become non-performing in the future if granted under the same criteria as in the 
past. In turn, the total amount of NPLs has actually increased, particularly if we consider the 
whole financial system, i.e., also the NPLs transferred to the AMCs. The latter have only 
managed to dispose of about one third of the NPLs received. This is partly due to the poor 
legal framework under which the AMCs operate16. In fact, they have been relying mainly on 
debt-equity swaps or sales of collateral assets, since there is no market for trading of 
distressed securities in China. An additional problem is that only the best assets have been 
sold, which raises doubts about the recovery capacity of AMCs in the medium term and the 
costs for the Chinese authorities. Finally, notwithstanding the recapitalization efforts, bank 
solvency –which was already very weak– has fallen further. As Graph 6 shows, equity to total 
assets stands at 4.5%. The worst situation is that of policy lending banks. 
 
Graph 6. Equity to total assets by type of institution 
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The liberalization process has not managed to reduce the very large participation 
of the State in the banking system, except for the entry of some foreign branches and 
representative offices and the minority participation in some JSCBs. Competition is still weak, 
particularly among the largest banks. Price and quantity controls have not been fully lifted 
and, still, profitability, measured by the ROAA has deteriorated17. As previously mentioned, 
                                                                          
16. Moody’s (2004). 
17. This is particularly so excluding taxes. The reduction in the business tax to 5% in 2002 –the last of various scheduled 
cuts– has helped maintained after-tax earnings. 
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this does not seem to be related to heightened competition –the interest spread still hovers 
at 300 basis points– but rather to the rise in personnel expenditure and the increasing holding 
of excess reserves. The three policy lending banks are the least profitable institutions, 
measured by the ROAA (Graph 7)18. This could be expected given their focus on long-term 
development projects rather than profit maximization. SOCBs are the second least profitable 
group while JSCBs have a higher ROAA, which hints at a potential improvement in profitability 
when banks are opened to the private sector19. Cost efficiency has improved in the last few 
years, if measured by the cost to income ratio (Graph 8) although it is known that large 
inefficiencies exist particularly in policy lending banks and SOCBs.  
 
Graph 7. ROAA by type of institution 
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18. They also have the smallest net interest margin (Table A-1). 
19. The return on average equity (ROAE) follows a similar patter than ROAA (Table A-1) 
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Graph 8. Cost to income ratio by type of institution 
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
Total 
CCBs+Other 
JSCBs 
SOCBs
Source: Bankscope
 
One of the main objectives of strengthening regulation and supervision was the 
introduction of a more cautious approach towards risk. Although it is difficult to draw 
conclusions from the available evidence, the fact that bank lending has grown even faster in 
recent times could be worrisome. Being investment led, the over-heating of the Chinese 
economy implies multi-year funding generally based on overly optimistic assumptions. This 
implies that new NPLs may appear in the future raising the stock of NPLs to new record 
levels. The tougher provisioning rules introduced in 2001 do not seem to have increased 
significantly the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans (Graph 9) although the loan loss 
reserves are growing at a rate around 20% (Graph 10). This is not only the case of policy 
lending banks and SOCBs, but also JSCBs. Moreover, the attempts to improve corporate 
governance have not shown clear results yet. The recently created shareholder boards are 
still a formality and the practically full state-ownership biases the decisions taken by bank 
managers. Finally, Chinese banks are ill-equipped to adopt Basel II as they are still struggling 
to adopt Basel I. The large share of low-rated corporate bonds in their balance sheets will 
increase their need for additional capital under Basel II. In addition, operational risk will 
probably be large because of poor internal controls. 
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Graph 9. Loan loss reserve to gross loans by type of institution 
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Graph 10. Percent change in Loan loss reserve by type of institution 
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In sum, there does not seem to be a clear improvement in the functioning of the 
Chinese banking system associated with the reform process. This is not only the case 
for SOCBs but also for the whole banking system. The JSCBs, considered to some extent a 
laboratory of the reform because of their partial private ownership, offer mixed results. This 
might be so because the private sector is not yet in full control of these banks or, more 
generally, because it is too early to feel the benefits of the reforms. However, it could also be 
the case that the steps taken have not been bold enough and more aggressive measures are 
needed to change the course of events. 
The challenges that the Chinese economy faces –the huge financing needs for such 
a dynamic economy and the commitment to open-up to foreign competition under the WTO– 
call for an acceleration of reforms in the financial system. 
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The two fundamentals problems faced in the short-run are: (i) the large stock 
of NPLs coupled with the scarce capital, and (ii) how to transform existing banks into viable, 
financially sound and independent commercial institutions. The latter requires moving towards 
financial liberalization while strengthening bank regulation and supervision. This should limit 
the risk of a banking crisis induced by the liberalization process and has been the case in 
several countries20.  
Learning from the Chinese experience in the last few years, as well as that of other 
countries, a more comprehensive reform strategy should be introduced to avoid asymmetries 
in the functioning of the financial system. This would need to include a long-term vision of 
where the Chinese financial system should go in terms of size, structure, ownership and 
institutional functioning. To this end, the additional steps that might need to be taken in the 
three areas analyzed before are the following:  
Regarding bank restructuring, a more rapid and decisive action is needed to 
improve bank solvency. In particular, the accumulation of new NPLs should be avoided. To 
this end, the current situation of over-borrowing should be slowed down as soon as possible, 
but gradually, to avoid a hard-landing of the Chinese economy. In addition, bolder steps are 
needed towards the cleaning up of SOCBs balance sheets and their recapitalization, before 
listing them in the international capital markets. Until now, the conditionality imposed to 
receive new public capital injections has been rather limited, which contributes to maintaining 
“soft budget constraints”. In fact, the tight links between SOCBs and SOEs are another 
source of new NPLs, which needs to be addressed. Bank and enterprise restructuring should 
run in parallel, as has been done in other transition economies. Finally, improvements in 
bankruptcy and foreclosure loans are also needed, to help restore debt-payment capacity 
among viable firms and recover NPLs from banks and AMCs. This should include informal 
mechanisms to fasten the process. It would also be important to encourage foreign 
investment for the recovery of NPLs.  
Bank restructuring should lead to the rapid privatization of a large part of the 
banking system. Before privatising, the profitable parts of financial institutions should be 
identified so as to separate good assets from bad ones. In principle, only solvent institutions 
should be handed in to investors. Otherwise, there is a risk that these banks can never be 
profitable and that shareholder problems are bounced back to the public sector. In this 
regard, the entry of foreign capital should be welcome since they can introduce more 
sophisticated management and risk assessment techniques, as well as better corporate 
governance. For foreign capital to play an active role in modernizing the Chinese financial 
system, their presence should not be limited to small representative offices or branches 
focused on niche businesses, but should actually become a real competitive force in the 
intermediation of domestic savings.  
Regarding financial liberalization, more flexibility is needed in setting interest rates 
and in eliminating rules on credit allocation to reach a more efficient financial intermediation. 
However, such liberalization should not be carried out too rapidly given the undercapitalization 
of the banking system and the still weak banking regulation and supervision. The two are 
clear pre-conditions to full financial liberalization. In any event, financial liberalization should 
lead to the consolidation of the Chinese banking system, currently very fragmented by sector 
and geographical constrains. As the experience of other Asian countries shows, consolidation 
can improve financial soundness and efficiency since sounder banks are strengthened in the 
process. More competition between JSCBs, and also SOCBs, would be welcome to this end, 
as well as stepping up the entry of foreign capital. 
As for prudential regulation and supervision, additional steps need to be taken 
faster so that the process of financial liberalization can continue. Accounting rules need to 
                                                                          
20. Demirgürç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find empirical evidence that financial liberalization increases the probability 
of a banking crisis when financial regulation and supervision are not strengthened in the transition. 
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comply with international standards and external and internal auditing have to be enhanced. 
More detailed financial information should be disclosed regularly in order to promote market 
discipline. Supervisory authorities should also encourage better bank management 
techniques and a tighter grip on risk management. Prudential regulation can also help banks 
focus more on exchange rate risk, given the growing openness of the Chinese economy, the 
increasing importance of foreign currency deposits and the possible moral hazard stemming 
from the implicit guarantee of fixed exchange rate regime. The authorities’ commitment to 
introduce Basel II is welcome but it should be based on a faster implementation of Basel I.  
Another important limitation to a successful bank reform, especially when the 
liberalization and privatization processes are accelerated, is the lack of a deposit insurance 
system. This is particularly worrisome in light of the poor capitalization of most Chinese 
banks. While the introduction of a limited guarantee is welcome, it is crucial that the scale, 
scope and duration of the guarantee be spelled out in advance. Making explicit the extent to 
which the State will support bank deposits in case of bank closure can reduce moral hazard, 
as long as it is credible. 
Finally, China’s poor transparency is another limitation, whose importance will grow 
over time, as its banking system opens to foreign competition. In this regard, statistics, 
methodologies and data collection should clearly improve.  
All in all, it seems clear that a new comprehensive reform plan is urgently needed, 
where the authorities should clarify their long term view of the Chinese financial 
sector and the steps they will take to achieve it, with precise deadlines. The current reform 
process –while welcome– seems too slow and follows a piece-meal approach, which could 
lead to disruptions. In addition, the strategy should not be that of “growing out of the 
problem”, as could be interpreted on the basis of the rapid growth in bank lending. 
A faster pace of reform is particularly needed in the restructuring and regulation front 
and less so for financial liberalization. This is to strike the appropriate balance between reform 
and stability. Finally, deeper capital markets can also help in the reform of the banking 
system as a potential “spare wheel” in the event of systemic bank distress. 
There are signs that the Chinese authorities are moving in this direction although it is 
doubtful whether it will be fast enough. The reduction in NPLs and the attraction of fresh 
capital is key as well as the consolidation of the banking system, where the most viable and 
sounder banks acquire a leading role. 
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APPENDIX 
Graph A-1.GDP per capita and China's share on world's GDP 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
 s
h
ar
e 
of
 w
or
ld
 G
D
P 
b
as
ed
 o
n
 P
PP
 
(p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
G
D
P 
p
er
 c
ap
it
a,
 P
PP
 
(c
on
st
an
t 
1
9
9
5
 in
te
rn
at
io
n
al
 t
h
ou
sa
n
d
s 
of
 
U
S
D
)
Source: World Bank, WEO (IMF)
World's GDP per 
capita 
China´s share 
on world GDP
China's GDP per 
capita 
 
 
Graph A-2. GDP per capita and Population 
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Graph A-3. Real GDP growth and inflation rate 
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Graph A-4. Real and nominal effective exchange rates 
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Graph A-5. Government balance and current account balance 
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Graph A-6. Private consumption, gross capital formation and exports 
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Graph A-7. M2 and domestic credit growth 
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Graph A-8. M2 and domestic credit 
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Graph A-9. Government bonds and stock market capitalization 
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Graph A-10. International comparison of bank credit to the private sector, as a 
percentage of GDP 
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Graph A-11. International comparison of bank credit to the private sector, in USD 
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Graph A-12. International comparison of GDP per capita versus banks' deposits 
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Table A-1. Selected Indicators of the performance of Chinese banks21 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Return on average assets (ROAA) (%) 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.24 0.21 0.26 0.22 0.22
State-owned commercial banks 0.27 0.27 0.19 0.09 0.13 0.22 0.16 0.18
Other Commercial banks 1.27 1.26 1.20 0.78 0.48 0.41 0.39 0.36
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 1.01 0.97 0.63 0.42 0.40 0.37 0.33
Other - 1.27 1.59 1.03 0.58 0.43 0.46 0.47
Policy banks 0.02 0.08 -0.14 0.07 0.06 0.14 0.26 0.01
Return on average equity (ROAE) (%) 10.11 10.68 10.52 4.42 3.53 4.67 4.20 4.45
State-owned commercial banks 8.07 8.57 6.15 2.08 2.35 4.07 3.16 3.78
Other Commercial banks 17.16 17.64 17.02 11.13 7.28 6.90 8.00 9.24
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 17.62 17.18 11.62 8.64 9.26 9.31 9.23
Other - 14.06 16.85 10.67 6.04 4.69 6.18 9.27
Policy banks 0.35 1.80 -3.02 1.40 1.21 2.97 4.99 0.23
Net interest margin (%) 1.91 3.10 2.17 2.09 1.91 2.23 1.91 1.93
State-owned commercial banks 2.09 2.59 2.47 2.47 2.07 2.35 1.98 2.02
Other Commercial banks 2.31 2.80 2.82 2.60 2.29 2.27 2.01 2.07
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 2.33 2.74 2.66 2.23 2.32 2.18 2.07
Other - 2.65 2.97 2.50 2.39 2.18 1.57 2.06
Policy banks 0.26 6.44 -0.07 0.02 0.81 1.63 1.47 1.01
Cost to Income Ratio (%) 65.47 80.02 55.17 65.55 65.09 58.61 56.84 58.07
State-owned commercial banks 66.41 63.82 49.55 66.45 59.26 56.47 56.37 53.79
Other Commercial banks 47.15 51.74 49.78 60.14 71.07 64.59 54.90 53.31
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 52.93 53.45 61.68 62.78 57.82 54.45 53.98
Other - 49.60 43.13 57.24 83.09 77.96 56.59 50.88
Policy banks 3.93 101.13 67.53 34.25 48.49 23.47 6.23 64.93
Equity / Total Assets (%) 4.61 4.33 4.56 6.03 5.67 5.51 5.16 4.53
State-owned commercial banks 3.29 3.11 3.15 5.61 5.28 5.32 5.04 4.59
Other Commercial banks 7.38 6.99 7.13 6.93 6.25 5.63 4.19 3.75
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 5.75 5.60 5.31 4.53 4.10 3.79 3.49
Other - 9.03 9.78 9.63 9.50 8.79 5.59 4.67
Policy banks 4.53 4.70 4.60 4.73 4.59 4.72 5.98 2.81
Capital Funds / Liabilities (%) 4.84 4.53 4.78 6.42 6.01 5.83 5.44 4.75
State-owned commercial banks 3.40 3.21 3.26 5.94 5.57 5.62 5.31 4.81
Other Commercial banks 8.00 7.51 7.68 7.45 6.67 5.97 4.38 3.90
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 6.10 5.93 5.61 4.75 4.28 3.94 3.62
Other - 9.93 10.83 10.65 10.50 9.64 5.92 4.90
Policy banks 4.74 4.93 4.82 4.97 4.81 4.96 6.36 2.90
Loan Loss Reserve / Gross Loans (%) 1.39 1.13 1.03 1.25 1.65 1.51 1.81 1.81
State-owned commercial banks 1.59 1.16 1.00 1.12 1.52 1.24 1.66 1.82
Other Commercial banks 1.79 1.69 1.72 2.28 3.53 3.97 2.94 2.40
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 0.88 0.98 1.54 3.17 4.30 3.56 2.73
Other - 3.13 2.96 3.64 4.35 3.18 0.68 1.06
Policy banks 0.74 0.71 0.73 1.06 0.79 0.73 1.64 1.02
Loan Loss Provisions (USD millions) 13 454 2197 2957 3775 7062 10284 10324
State-owned commercial banks 0 402 2109 2409 3203 5565 7989 8798
Other Commercial banks 13 45 74 113 484 847 1015 1527
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 45 74 113 469 765 849 1135
Other - - 0 0 15 82 166 392
Policy banks 0 0 0 436 89 650 1281 0
Source: Bankscope  
 
                                                                          
21. Bankscope is not an exhaustive database although the coverage of the banking system tends to be very large. In the 
case of China, it amounts more than 82% of the total bank assets.  
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Table A-2. Asset Structure of the Chinese Banking Sector 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Interbank assets (net) + call loans 6.0 9.5 9.1 7.7 7.9 7.6 8.4 8.2
State-owned commercial banks 8.1 11.3 10.6 8.4 8.2 7.6 8.3 8.4
Other Commercial banks 1.3 7.9 10.2 8.9 11.0 10.7 11.3 10.2
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 11.4 14.7 11.9 13.3 12.2 11.8 10.4
Other - 2.2 2.4 3.9 6.6 7.8 9.8 9.2
Policy banks 3.2 3.5 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.3 0.7 2.3
Other liquid assets 23.8 17.2 15.1 13.4 12.2 10.8 7.6 6.3
State-owned commercial banks 23.5 16.9 15.1 13.2 11.8 10.1 7.6 5.8
Other Commercial banks 38.7 29.1 26.1 24.2 22.2 19.9 10.1 8.5
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 20.4 18.7 15.9 15.3 14.6 10.8 9.1
Other - 43.7 38.7 38.0 35.2 30.9 7.3 6.4
Policy banks 6.1 2.2 1.4 1.3 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.5
Loans 55.8 59.3 62.6 62.2 59.8 57.5 57.3 58.8
State-owned commercial banks 52.4 57.6 60.7 61.1 57.6 55.9 56.8 57.9
Other Commercial banks 49.0 48.0 48.9 48.5 47.0 47.6 52.7 55.2
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 49.8 48.6 50.6 49.7 49.8 52.9 56.8
Other - 44.9 49.3 44.8 41.9 42.9 52.1 49.8
Policy banks 85.7 88.7 93.2 89.7 92.2 89.2 81.7 93.5
Other risky assets 12.9 12.3 11.3 14.9 18.2 22.2 24.7 24.7
State-owned commercial banks 14.4 12.2 11.4 15.2 20.3 24.3 25.2 26.0
Other Commercial banks 10.0 14.1 13.7 17.2 18.2 20.3 24.3 24.8
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 17.6 16.8 20.2 19.9 21.8 23.0 22.5
Other - 8.3 8.4 12.0 15.0 17.1 28.9 33.2
Policy banks 4.9 5.4 3.0 6.8 4.9 8.5 16.6 1.7
Fixed Assets 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9
State-owned commercial banks 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.9
Other Commercial banks 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.3
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3
Other - 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.8 1.3
Policy banks 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 1.0
Source: Bankscope
 (as a percentage of total assets)
 
 
Table A-3. Liability Structure of the Chinese Banking Sector 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Deposits 72.8 77.9 87.4 87.4 85.7 88.4 88.0 92.7
State-owned commercial banks 72.7 77.8 92.0 94.1 94.4 95.4 95.7 96.2
Other Commercial banks 83.4 89.4 92.5 92.3 83.1 83.8 83.4 82.6
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 86.3 90.4 90.3 77.6 79.2 81.6 81.7
Other - 94.9 96.2 95.6 94.1 93.8 89.7 85.5
Policy banks 70.4 68.4 67.9 52.9 50.2 47.6 5.4 85.0
Borrowings 19.5 15.1 6.2 6.8 7.5 5.9 6.3 1.6
State-owned commercial banks 19.6 15.0 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.4
Other Commercial banks 8.2 3.5 0.7 0.7 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.5
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 4.6 1.0 0.9 2.1 1.8 0.7 0.8
Other - 1.7 0.3 0.2 1.1 1.5 5.6 8.6
Policy banks 22.9 25.6 28.5 40.2 45.2 49.1 90.2 12.1
Capital plus reserves 4.8 4.5 4.8 6.4 6.0 5.8 5.4 4.7
State-owned commercial banks 3.4 3.2 3.3 5.9 5.6 5.6 5.3 4.8
Other Commercial banks 8.0 7.5 7.7 7.4 6.7 6.0 4.4 3.9
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 6.1 5.9 5.6 4.7 4.3 3.9 3.6
Other - 9.9 10.8 10.7 10.5 9.6 5.9 4.9
Policy banks 4.7 4.9 4.8 5.0 4.8 5.0 6.4 2.9
Source: Bankscope
 (as a percentage of total liabilities)
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Table A-4. Income and Expenditure Structure of the Chinese Banking Sector 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Interest income 89.7 81.4 90.9 91.5 92.2 93.3 92.6 89.1
State-owned commercial banks 95.9 94.7 96.5 96.7 95.1 95.5 94.6 93.4
Other Commercial banks 85.5 86.0 87.2 90.8 94.2 94.6 95.4 95.2
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 82.9 83.5 87.9 95.9 95.2 95.0 94.7
Other - 91.2 92.3 94.2 92.2 93.8 96.8 96.9
Policy banks 98.8 50.5 88.4 85.8 95.4 98.4 97.7 97.5
Commission Income 1.9 2.3 2.4 2.5 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.3
State-owned commercial banks 2.3 2.8 2.5 2.8 3.6 4.2 4.8 4.8
Other Commercial banks 1.3 4.2 4.5 3.6 4.1 4.4 4.0 4.0
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 2.0 2.5 2.1 2.9 3.6 4.4 4.7
Other - 7.9 7.4 5.5 5.7 5.7 2.4 2.0
Policy banks 1.2 0.2 0.3 0.7 4.5 1.3 1.7 2.4
Other Income 8.4 16.3 6.7 6.0 3.6 2.4 3.0 6.5
State-owned commercial banks 1.8 2.5 1.0 0.5 1.2 0.4 0.7 1.8
Other Commercial banks 13.2 9.8 8.3 5.6 1.6 0.9 0.7 0.8
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 15.2 14.0 10.0 1.2 1.2 0.6 0.7
Other - 0.9 0.3 0.3 2.1 0.5 0.9 1.0
Policy banks 0.0 49.3 11.3 13.4 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.0
Interest Expenditure 74.8 60.1 75.8 70.7 65.5 63.3 54.4 45.4
State-owned commercial banks 79.5 77.7 76.4 68.6 64.9 64.4 54.5 46.0
Other Commercial banks 72.8 70.6 70.5 68.0 61.1 58.8 54.4 48.8
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 68.6 64.4 59.4 59.1 54.7 53.1 47.5
Other - 73.9 78.9 78.0 63.4 64.4 58.9 53.1
Policy banks 97.3 16.7 92.2 91.2 89.3 81.1 70.0 78.2
Personnel Expenditure - - 0.9 1.1 1.7 2.9 3.9 4.8
State-owned commercial banks - - 1.5 1.6 2.5 3.9 4.8 6.1
Other Commercial banks - - 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.9 2.2 2.4
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - - 0.2 0.2 1.3 1.5 2.8 3.2
Other - - - - - - - -
Policy banks - - - - - - - -
Other Expenditure (1) 25.2 39.9 23.3 28.3 32.7 33.8 41.7 49.7
State-owned commercial banks 20.5 22.3 22.1 29.8 32.6 31.7 40.6 47.9
Other Commercial banks 27.2 29.4 29.4 31.8 38.2 40.4 43.4 48.8
Joint Stock Commercial Banks - 31.4 35.3 40.4 39.6 43.8 44.1 49.3
Other - 26.1 21.1 22.0 36.6 35.6 41.1 46.9
Policy banks 2.7 83.3 7.8 8.8 10.7 18.9 30.0 21.8
(1) Include personnel expenditures if it is not reported before.
Source: Bankscope
 (as a percentage of total income and expenditure respectively)
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